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Abstract
We investigate the effect of bureaucratic corruption on 
economic development when women are discriminated 
against in the labor market. The analysis is based on a dynamic 
general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation 
drives economic development. The government appoints 
bureaucrats to administer public policy. Corruption arises 
due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public 
funds. In the event of detection and dismissal, the private 
sector serves as the bureaucrats' outside option. Our main 
results can be summarized as follows: first, when the 
public sector is a more gender- equal employer than the 
private sector, female bureaucrats are less corrupt than 
male; second, corruption and development are jointly 
determined allowing the possibility of a poverty trap; and 
third, a policy to increase female participation in the public 
sector potentially reduces corruption and fosters economic 
development.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Despite the efforts of governments and multilateral institutions to fight corruption and reduce gender 
inequality, there still seems to be a long road ahead. Particularly in developing economies, the inci-
dence of corruption and the extent of gender inequality are considerably greater than in advanced 
economies. With multiple policy objectives competing for limiting resources, governments have to 
be profound in designing policies. In this paper we seek to contribute to this task. We illustrate why 
increasing female participation in government may be an effective anti- corruption policy, simultane-
ously contributing to reduce gender inequality and foster economic development.
Our theory is based on the seminal studies by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) and sub-
sequent studies (Chen, 2013; Esarey & Chirillo, 2013; Esarey & Schwindt- Bayer, 2018, 2019; Grimes 
& Wängnerud, 2012; Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Michailova & Melnykovska, 2009; Paweenawat, 2018; 
Samimi & Hosseinmardi, 2011; Treisman, 2007; Wängnerud, 2010) which found a negative correla-
tion between women in politics and corruption using country/state- level studies. However, based on 
evidence from individual- level studies, there is no consensus on the proposition that women are intrin-
sically more honest than men (Alhassan- Alolo, 2007; Alatas et al., 2009; Bowman & Giligan, 2008; 
Debski et  al.,  2018; Esarey & Chirillo,  2013; Goetz,  2007; Lee & Guven,  2013; Mukherjee & 
Gokcekus, 2004; Schulze & Frank, 2003; Torgler & Valev, 2010; Rivas, 2013; Vijayalakshmi, 2008).
Without relying on gender differences in moral attitudes, our paper provides an economic expla-
nation for the negative correlation between female participation in government and corruption. Our 
theory rests on the idea that the private sector serves as an outside option for dismissed bureaucrats. 
As women are more wage- discriminated against in the private sector than in the public sector, female 
bureaucrats have a lower- value outside option than their male counterparts. Consequently, female bu-
reaucrats have lower incentives to be corrupt than male bureaucrats. There is ample evidence of wage 
discrimination against women in both the public and private sectors. Moreover, in a wide range of 
countries, there is evidence that women are less wage- discriminated against in the public sector than 
in the private sector. We summarize this evidence in Table 1. The World Bank (2012) also reported 
the same findings for a wide range of countries. Furthermore, other studies found that corruption is 
negatively associated with the public– private sector wage ratio (Goel & Rich, 1989; Van Rijckeghem 
& Weder, 2001).
We have two objectives in this paper: first, to show how increasing female participation in the 
public sector may result in lower bureaucratic malfeasance, without assuming gender differences in 
tolerance of corruption; and second, to explore the dynamic general equilibrium interactions between 
female participation in the public sector, corruption, and economic development. We establish our 
results within a dynamic general equilibrium framework where corruption and development are deter-
mined jointly and endogenously as the outcomes of the individuals' decision given the structure of the 
economy. A key feature of our model is the existence of multiple development regimes and multiple 
(history- dependent) equilibria, including a poverty trap.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to present a theoretical analysis of the links 
between female participation in the public sector, corruption, and economic development in a macro-
economic framework. To date, the work of Echazu (2010) is the only formal theoretical investigation 
on the effects on corruption of increasing female participation in the government. Unlike our study, 
Echazu assumes gender empathy to explain the gender– corruption nexus in a microeconomic partial 
equilibrium framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief literature review. 
In Section 3 we present our basic framework and discuss the implications of increasing female partic-
ipation in the government. Section 4 concludes.
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2 |  LITERATURE REVIEW
Dollar et  al.  (2001) and Swamy et  al.  (2001) found a strong and statistically significant nega-
tive association between female participation in the government and corruption in their cross- 
country studies. Despite a few critiques (Branisa et al., 2013; Debski et al., 2018; Hazarika, 2018; 
Sung, 2003, 2012), there exist later studies, in various contexts, lending further support to the find-
ings of Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. Some based their findings on the analysis of a world sample 
(Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Treisman, 2007). Others provided evidence which is region- specific, country- 
specific, or context- specific. These include evidence found in developing countries (Samimi & 
Hosseinmardi,  2011), transition countries (Michailova & Melnykovska,  2009), Mexican states 
(Grimes & Wängnerud,  2012; Wängnerud,  2010), developed countries (Chen,  2013), democratic- 
leaning countries (Esarey & Chirillo,  2013; Esarey & Schwindt- Bayer,  2019), democratic- leaning 
countries with high electoral accountability (Esarey & Schwindt- Bayer, 2018), and Asian countries 
(Paweenawat,  2018). Some of these studies have employed instrumental variable techniques and/
or controlled for fixed effects, thereby providing further evidence of causality (Chen, 2013; Esarey 
& Schwindt- Bayer, 2018, 2019; Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Paweenawat, 2018). Grimes and Wängnerud 
(2012) and Esarey and Schwindt- Bayer (2019) also found evidence of a two- way causal relationship 
between women in politics and corruption. Considering the weight of the existing evidence, there 
seems to be a consensus that increasing female participation in the government reduces corruption.
However, the existing evidence from individual- level studies has not led to a consensus about 
women's moral superiority. Some found women are less likely to approve corrupt behavior than men 
(Armantier & Boly,  2013; Bowman & Giligan,  2008; Lee & Guven,  2013; Lee & Guven,  2013; 
Michailova & Melnykovska,  2009; Rivas,  2013; Schulze & Frank,  2003; Swamy et  al.,  2001; 
Torgler & Valev,  2010) due to differences in biology, psychology, and experiences including risk 
profile. Others pointed out women may be less corrupt than men due to their limited opportuni-
ties attributed to the restricted access to male- dominated public office (Alhassan- Alolo,  2007; 
T A B L E  1  Evidence of smaller gender wage gaps in the public sector than in the private sector
Authors Countries
Arulampalam et al. (2007) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
United Kingdom
Aslam and Kingdon (2009) Pakistan
Baron and Cobb- Clark (2010) Australia
Chatterji et al. (2007) United Kingdom
Daoud and Shanti (2016) Palestine
Fuller (2005), Gunderson (1979), Mueller (1998) Canada
Glinskaya and Lokshin (2007) India




Panizza and Qiang (2005) Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela
Freeman (1987), Smith (1976) USA
Tansel (2005) Turkey
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Esarey & Chirillo, 2013; Goetz, 2007), culture (Alatas et al., 2009; Debski et al., 2018), institutional 
contexts (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013, 2018; Vijayalakshmi, 2008) and gender balance (Mukherjee & 
Gokcekus, 2004). To date, the notion that women are intrinsically less corrupt than men is still subject 
to debate.
3 |  THE MODEL
Time is discrete in our framework and is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2,….. We consider an economy inhabited 
by two- period- lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic families. Agents work 
when they are young and consume when they are old. Population is constant and equal to x. Half of the 
population are male (denoted by m) and the other half are female (denoted by f ). Formally, x = xm + xf  
and xm = xf . The size of the skilled labor force in this economy is denoted by n, and not all agents 
are skilled: n ⊂ x, where n = nm + nf . Skilled agents are homogeneous in terms of productivity and 
can work in either the private or public sector. In turn, the private sector is divided into two sectors: 
modern and traditional. Firms in the modern sector hire labor from skilled agents and rent capital 
from all agents. Modern sector workers are denoted by h = hm + hf . There is also a fixed number of 
unskilled agents, denoted by l = lm + lf , who work for firms in the traditional sector. The public sector 
hires labor from skilled agents to administer public funds. Public sector workers or bureaucrats are 
denoted by b = bm + bf . Finally, all agents are assumed to be risk- neutral. Given this setting, we can 
express the total population, x, as follows: 
The government offers a limited number of positions b ⊂ n, whereas the modern sector can hire any 
worker willing to supply labor inelastically. Skilled agents have preferences regarding the sector they 
would like to join. If they work in their preferred sector, they derive additional utility, otherwise no addi-
tional utility is derived. We assume that male and female agents derive the same additional utility from 
working in their preferred sector. Hence, skilled agents with a preference for public service will obtain an 
additional utility of b if they work in the public sector, and 0 if they work for a private firm. Similarly, 
skilled agents with a preference for the private sector will obtain an additional utility of h if they work 
in the modern sector, and 0 if they work in the public sector. Adding a parameter restriction on h, skilled 
agents with a preference for the private sector will effectively choose to work in the modern sector.
Specifically, when deciding in which sector to work, agents take into account the public– private 
wage differential and the additional utility derived from working in their preferred sector. In princi-
ple, the value of h should compensate for the wage differential (if any) to induce skilled agents with 
a preference for the private sector to choose to work for a firm in the modern sector. Consequently, 
only skilled agents with a public sector preference will apply to work as bureaucrats. We assume there 
are more skilled agents with a public sector preference than civil service vacancies. As such, public 
sector positions are always filled, and some skilled agents with a taste for working in the public sector 
have to work in the modern sector. This assumption is not crucial in deriving our result. However, it 
ensures that the government is always able to fill all public sector vacancies and get replacements for 
dismissed corrupt bureaucrats.
The government hires bureaucrats to administer public funds. Bureaucrats supply productive pub-
lic goods and services which are used in the traditional sector. Corruption arises as a result of the op-
portunities public officials have to embezzle public money. The government cannot perfectly monitor 
(1)x ≡ n + l ≡ h + b + l.
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the actions of bureaucrats. If a civil servant is discovered embezzling public funds, they are fined the 
full amount of their legal and illegal income. We assume all corruptible bureaucrats who get caught 
are able to find another position in the modern sector. Rational bureaucrats take into consideration the 
public– private wage differential when calculating their expected utility from being corrupt.
3.1 | Private sector
3.1.1 | Firms
Output in this economy is produced in two sectors: modern and traditional. These sectors have different 
production technologies and use different types of inputs of production. Each sector is represented by 
a unit mass of firms. Firms hire inputs in perfectly competitive markets.
The representative firm in the modern sector produces output using skilled labor and capital with 
positive production externalities as a result of learning by doing (or learning by investing). Formally, 
units of output are produced according to the following technology:
where  ∈ (0, 1), hit denotes skilled labor of gender i (i = f, m), kt denotes capital, and Kt denotes aggregate 
capital which serves as the usual proxy for the stock of disembodied knowledge.1
We assume the government derives revenue from this sector by imposing a constant proportional 
tax rate of  ∈ (0, 1) on its output. Furthermore, following Becker (1971), we assume firms have a 
“taste for discrimination.” Firms are therefore willing to pay in terms of reduced profits to reduce their 
association with female workers; firms are utility maximizers rather than profit maximizers. The rep-
resentative firm is interested in finding the level of wages wh
it
 that maximizes its utility. In particular, 
the firm will act as if the net cost of employing a female worker is wh
it
(1 + d), where d > 0 is Becker 
(1971)'s “discrimination coefficient” and is assumed to be exogenous. The parameter d represents the 
non- monetary cost of discrimination against hiring female workers for the firm.
Assuming the price of output in the modern sector is equal to 1, the firm's utility is given by.
The utility maximization conditions are therefore given by
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where 1∕ (1 + d) ∈ (0, 1). To simplify the algebra in our analysis, we define  ≡ 1∕ (1 + d), where 
 ∈ (0, 1), and consequently
In equilibrium, ht = h and kt = Kt, thus Equations (4)– (6) can be written as.
Thus, we find that, in equilibrium, wages are a (linear) function of the capital stock and the return of cap-
ital is constant over time.
Next, output in the traditional sector is produced by unskilled agents whose productivity is augmented 
by the provision of public goods and services that are targeted towards the poor (e.g., health care and ed-
ucation). As the poorer and the less educated members of society tend to gain the most from public goods 
provision (Anand & Ravallion, 1993; Bidani & Ravallion, 1997), we assume public goods only play a 
role in the traditional sector. We also assume the government does not impose any taxes on this sector and 
there is no wage discrimination in this sector. The production function of the traditional sector is given by.
where lt denotes unskilled labor and gt denotes government expenditure on public goods and services.
Each unskilled agent receives a wage of wl
t
 for providing their labor. Assuming the price of output 
in the traditional sector is equal to 1, profit is given by
and profit maximization implies
The government is implicitly taxing skilled workers (male and female) and using these resources to fi-
nance expenditure in health care and education to increase the productivity of unskilled workers. Provided 
the population of unskilled workers is not lower than the population of skilled agents (which is always the 
case), the wages of skilled workers will always be higher than the wages of unskilled agents:
3.1.2 | Agents
The population of agents is divided into skilled agents and unskilled agents. Each skilled agent sup-
plies one unit of labor to firms in the modern sector, and each unskilled agent supplies one unit of 
labor to firms in the traditional sector. Each young agent of generation t and gender i working as a 
worker of type j ( j = l, h) receives a salary of wj
it















 (1 − ) kt
h1−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endowment to a (modern/traditional) firm. All agents save their total income at the market rate of 
interest r to obtain a final level of wealth (1 + r) zj
it
 when they reach old age.
A modern sector agent consumes part of its wealth and bequeaths the remainder to their offspring. 
We assume workers in the traditional sector do not leave bequests to their offspring because their income 
is too low. This is consistent with the notion of bequest as a luxury good (Kopczuk & Lupton, 2007).
Agents working in the modern sector are of two types: those with private sector preference; and those 
with public sector preference who could not obtain a job in the public sector. As described earlier, the 
former derive additional utility from working in the private sector, while the latter obtain no additional 
utility. Agents with a private sector preference and working in the private sector derive a lifetime utility of
and agents with a public sector preference but working in the private sector derive a lifetime utility of
Agents working in the traditional sector derive a lifetime utility of
The role of bequests in the model is to ensure the existence of the non- degenerate steady- state equi-
librium. Thus, we adopt the simplest form of motive for giving bequests which is altruism consistent 
with the simple “warm glow” or “joy of giving”; this assumption is reflected by a strictly concave 
function  ( ⋅ ) that satisfies the usual Inada conditions. Utility is maximized by setting � ( ⋅ ) = 1, im-
plying an optimal fixed size of bequest from one generation to the next, qit = qit+1 = q.
As the rate of interest r is constant in equilibrium, the expected utility of an agent is fully deter-










3.2 | Public sector
3.2.1 | Government
The objective of the government is to foster economic development and reduce inequality. The gov-
ernment achieves this by providing public goods and services, represented by gt, which contribute to 
the efficiency of output production in the traditional sector, such as health care and education. The 
government hires bureaucrats to distribute these public funds. Corruption may arise due to the oppor-
tunity of bureaucrats to benefit by abusing their positions of authority.
The government determines the salaries of bureaucrats, wb
it
, as follows. Any bureaucrat of gender 
i can work for a modern sector firm to receive an income equal to the wage paid to the modern sector 
worker of gender i, wh
it
. The government is interested in attracting agents with a preference for the 
public sector, but avoiding agents that seek to supplement their income through corruption. To achieve 
this, the government compares the expected utility of agents from working in the private and public 
sectors, and sets the salaries of bureaucrats within the range.
(15)uhh
it
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The lower bound, wh
it
− b∕ (1 + r), is the minimum salary that makes an (honest) agent with a public sec-
tor preference indifferent between working for a private company and the government. The upper bound, 
wh
it
+ h∕ (1 + r), is the corresponding minimum salary that makes an agent with a private sector prefer-




.2 Thus, by paying the same as in the private sector, the government attracts agents with a government 
preference and provides potentially corrupt agents a disincentive to join. Finally, it is important to mention 
that the government is not pursuing a wage- based policy to tackle corruption. This is consistent with a 
recent survey by Gans- Morse et al. (2018) that provides evidence that low wages are associated with high 
corruption, but high wages are not a sufficient condition to reduce corruption.
Moreover, we assume the government also follows an anti- discriminatory policy. This assumption 
is based on existing evidence that the public sector discriminates against women less than the private 
sector. These findings are generally taken as evidence that anti- discrimination enforcement is more 
effectively and aggressively implemented in the public sector than in the private sector (Arulampalam 
et  al.,  2007; Barón & Cobb- Clark,  2010; Fuller,  2005; Melly,  2005; Panizza & Qiang,  2005; 
Tansel, 2005). Our main results will remain if the government also wage- discriminates against female 
workers as long as the public sector wage- discriminates against females less than the private sector. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume that male and female bureaucrats are paid the same wage.
Given all the above considerations, salaries for all bureaucrats in the public sector are set as follows:
Assuming that the value of h is uniform across gender, we need to set h ≥ (1 − )wh
mt
 to make sure that 
only skilled females with public sector preference apply to work as bureaucrats. In other words, women 
with private sector preference are willing to accept a lower wage in the modern sector, provided the loss in 
income is compensated by the extra utility they derive from working in their preferred job.
The government finances its expenditures each period by running a balanced budget. Its revenue 
consists of the taxes paid by firms plus income recovered from bureaucrats caught engaging in corrup-
tion. The government uses the remaining public funds to pay for public goods and services, bureau-
crats' salaries and an imprecise surveillance technology to monitor the behavior of public officials. 
Corruption occurs after the tax rate has been set, and consequently, the government cannot replace 
the amount stolen by bureaucrats by raising taxes. The government is fully aware when corruption is 
occurring but it cannot retrieve all stolen income due to its imperfect powers of detection. This implies 
that corrupt bureaucrats face the probability of detection, p ∈ (0, 1), for each individual corrupt act.
3.2.2 | Bureaucrats
The population of bureaucrats is a measure of mass b. Each bureaucrat supplies one unit of labor to 
the government for the purpose of administering public funds for the procurement of public goods 
and services. Such delegation of authority may lead to corruption as bureaucrats may be tempted to 
appropriate a fraction of public funds under their responsibility. As our focus is on gender differences 
in incentives to be corrupt, we assume for simplicity that all bureaucrats are corruptible. Generally, 
bureaucrats may try to avoid detection in various ways, including hiding their illegal income and 
investing it differently from their legal income. Similar to Blackburn and Sarmah (2008), we consider 
a simple scenario where bureaucrats hide their illegal income instead of investing it in capital in order 
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Furthermore, we assume that all bureaucrats who get caught can find work in the modern sec-
tor. That is, the modern sector is the bureaucrats' outside option. We adopt this assumption due to 
the evidence of a relationship between the public– private sector wage ratio and corruption (Goel & 
Rich, 1989; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). This evidence supports our argument that working in 
the modern sector is an outside option for a bureaucrat.
After the dismissal of corrupt bureaucrats who get caught, the government conducts a second wave 
of hiring to fill the vacancies. The government replaces dismissed bureaucrats by attracting skilled 
agents from the modern sector with a preference to work in the public sector. To preserve the clarity 
of our subsequent analysis, we assume that the government keeps the gender ratio constant in the first 
and second wave of hiring. Finally, we assume that after uncovering and dismissing corrupt bureau-
crats, the government will very closely monitor the public projects that were under their supervision. 
As such, the replacement bureaucrats face an implicit probability of detection equal to 1.
Bureaucrats' incentives to be corrupt are modeled as in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), using a 
variant of Becker and Stigler's (1974) model. Their expected income from being corrupt is determined 
by the amount of embezzlement, the number of times the embezzlement takes place, the probability of 
being detected, and the penalties incurred in the event of detection. Corrupt bureaucrats can commit 
embezzlement more than once during their service. To simplify, the embezzled amount is exogenous 
and normalized to 1. The level of corruption is therefore determined by the number of corrupt acts. A 
bureaucrat of gender i who engages in corruption gets caught with probability pCit ∈ (0, 1), and avoids 
detection with probability 1 − pCit. The overall probability of detection, pCit, equals the probability of 
detection for each individual corrupt act, p, multiplied by the number of times the corrupt act is commit-
ted by a bureaucrat of gender i, Cit.
3 If a bureaucrat is found engaging in corruption, then they are fired 
and subsequently have to find a job in the modern sector. Based on our specification, the modern sector 
is always hiring. Thus, dismissed bureaucrats will always be able to find a job in the modern sector.
Each young bureaucrat of generation t and gender i receives an income of zb
it
 comprising a salary 
of wb
it
 from supplying their labor inelastically to the government plus a bequest qit which they save 
at the market interest rate r to obtain a final level of wealth of (1 + r) zb
it
+ Cit when they reach old 
age. A bureaucrat consumes part of their wealth and bequeaths the remainder to their offspring. As 
all bureaucrats are skilled agents who prefer to work in the public sector, they derive an additional 
utility of b from working in the government. With probability 1 − pCit a corrupt bureaucrat of gender 






+ Cit + 





probability pCit a corrupt bureaucrat of gender i is caught and goes to the modern sector and obtains 










. A corruptible bureaucrat will choose the op-
timum number of corrupt acts by maximizing their expected utility while balancing the costs and 
benefits from corruption. We assume that all bureaucrats are risk- neutral. Thus, the expected utility of 
a corruptible bureaucrat is given by
In the same way as for the modern sector agents,  ( ⋅ ) is a strictly concave function that satisfies the 
usual Inada conditions and utility is maximized by setting � ( ⋅ ) = 1, implying an optimal fixed size 
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The bureaucrat takes the probability of detection for a single corrupt act as given and ignores the behavior 








 and all other variables 
















, Equation (20) tells us that, ceteris paribus, if the gender wage gap in the public 
sector is smaller than the gender wage gap in the private sector, male bureaucrats will commit more cor-
rupt acts than female bureaucrats.
Furthermore, deriving Cit with respect to p in Equation (20) yields
This implies that the higher the probability of being detected for each individual corrupt act, the lower the 
number of corrupt acts that will be committed. As such, if female bureaucrats face a higher probability of 
being caught (Wängnerud, 2010), they will have lower incentives to be corrupt in the public sector. This is 
also true if p represents perceived instead of actual probability of detection and, in fact, if women perceive 
a higher probability of detection than men as suggested by Richards and Tittle (1981).
By combining Equations (7), (18), and (20), we obtain the number of corrupt acts of male and 
female bureaucrats respectively as follows:
By choosing optimum Cit, a bureaucrat of gender i maximizes their expected utility; this maximum 
expected utility is higher than the bureaucrat's utility from being honest (see Appendix A). By com-
paring Equations (22) and (23), and taking into account that  ∈ (0, 1), it should be clear that Cmt ≥ Cft 
for any given value of p and b. In particular,
Equation (24) reveals that the higher the gender discrimination women face in the private sector 
relative to the public sector (i.e., the lower the value of ), the fewer the corrupt acts that female 
bureaucrats commit relative to their male counterparts. The economic intuition behind this is that 
female bureaucrats face lower incentives to be corrupt than male bureaucrats when the value of their 
outside option relative to their earnings in the public sector is lower. Equations (23) and (24) also tell 
us that as the economy develops (i.e., with a higher kt and consequently higher whmt), female bureau-
crats reduce their number of corrupt acts.5 Higher wh
mt
 decreases the value of the female bureaucrats' 
outside option relative to their earnings in the public sector, thereby lowering their incentives to be 
corrupt. This is because female and male bureaucrats are paid the same wage as male workers in the 
modern sector (wh
mt
), but female workers in the modern sector earn only a fraction of wh
mt
 due to gender 
discrimination.
Moreover, depending on the value of p, which is exogenously given and the same across gender, 



























(24)Cmt − Cft =
1
2
(1 + r) (1 − )wh
mt
≥ 0.
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be honest while male bureaucrats still choose to be corrupt. In fact, male bureaucrats require a higher 
threshold value of p than female bureaucrats to have incentives to behave honestly. We can find these 
probability threshold values for bureaucrats of gender i, p∗
it
, by setting Cmt = 0 and Cft = 0 to obtain




 for any given value of b. This implies that male 
bureaucrats need to face a higher probability of being detected than female bureaucrats to behave honestly. 




∈ (0, 1), we set b ≥ 1.
Also, if p∗
ft
< p < p∗
mt
, all women in the public sector behave honestly while all men in the public 
sector are corrupt (i.e., Cft = 0, Cmt > 0). As p∗ft is a decreasing function of w
h
mt
, there is a critical level 
of wage below which Cft, Cmt > 0 and above which Cft = 0, Cmt > 0:
Moreover, if we combine Equations (8) and (27), we can find a critical level of capital below which both 
men and women bureaucrats are corrupt, and above which only men bureaucrats are corrupt while women 
bureaucrats are honest:





, kC > 0, we need to set 1
p
− 𝜙b > 0. Consequently, we establish a relationship be-
tween corruption and development where higher development reduces corruption by inducing female 
bureaucrats to be less corrupt.6
In equilibrium, the total number of bureaucrats is equal to the number of successful corrupt bu-
reaucrats (i.e., those who are not caught) plus the number of replacement bureaucrats. As mentioned 
earlier, the replacement bureaucrats are honest as they face p = 1. The utility of a replacement bureau-
crat of gender i is given by
and the utility of a successful corruptible bureaucrat of gender i is given by:
As indicated earlier, each successful corrupt bureaucrat of gender i hides their illegal income, Cit, in-






























= (1 + r) zb
it







= (1 + r) zb
it
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3.3 | General equilibrium
We obtain the dynamic path of capital accumulation in the economy by imposing the equilibrium 
condition in the capital market by which the total demand for capital is equal to the total supply. 
To determine the supply of capital (savings), it is necessary to establish the level of government 
expenditure on public goods and services.
The budget of the government is derived as follows. The only source of revenue for the government 








. Moreover, in equilibrium kt = Kt and 
ht = h, therefore yht = h
kt. The government uses this revenue to pay salaries to bureaucrats, bwhmt, 
to provide public goods and services, gt, and to finance an imperfect monitoring (or surveillance) 
technology at an exogenously given cost of s.7 In addition, due to the opportunity for corruption, an 
amount Et is embezzled by corrupt bureaucrats. Thus, corruption affects this economy through its im-
pact on gt. Specifically, corruption causes public goods provision to be lower by the amount Et and s. 
The government runs a balanced budget by equating revenue and expenditure such that
where
Substituting the optimum value for Cmt and Cft into Equation (32) yields
Finally, by substituting Equations (4) and (33) into Equation (31), we get the final expression for gt:
Notice that, given that the government runs a balanced budget, gt ≥ 0 for all t. In other words, bureaucrats 
cannot embezzle more resources than are available for the provision of public goods.
From Equation (32), we can see that a higher number of corrupt acts increases the overall probabil-
ity of being detected and at the same time increases the total amount that is successfully embezzled. 




































































































−s if kt ≥ k
C.
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Consequently, if kt < kC the net effect of increasing the female proportion in the public sector on total 
embezzlement is not obvious. Let us explore this in more detail. By finding the derivative of Equation 
(33) with respect to bft and taking into account that bmt = b − bft, we obtain
Considering Equations (31) and (35), it is easy to see that the higher the number of female bureaucrats 
(the higher bft), the lower is embezzlement, and the higher is the provision of public goods and services. 
We will return to this discussion in our subsequent analysis.
We now deduce total savings in the economy and the equation that governs capital accumulation. 
Each agent employed in the traditional sector, of whom there are l, saves gt + q. Each male agent in 
the modern sector, of whom there are hmt, saves whmt + q. Each female agent in the modern sector, of 
whom there are hft, saves whft + q. Each of the bureaucrats, of whom there are b, saves w
h
mt
+ q. By 
collecting all these terms together, we find the total savings in the economy:
Substituting Equations (1), (4), and (7) into Equation (36), and imposing the equilibrium condition in the 
capital market, kt+1 = St, we obtain the dynamic capital accumulation equation:
From this equation we can see that gt affects capital accumulation and therefore development. 
As corruption affects this economy by reducing gt (see Equation (31)), we establish how corruption 
affects economic development in this economy. Taken together, the results in Equations (34) and (37) 
imply a two- way causal relationship between corruption and development. The full implications of 
this are shown by consolidating the results into a single expression that characterizes the capital accu-
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<0 if kt ≥ k
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h −  (1 − )
]
+  (1 − )
(
hmt + hft + b
))
∕h1− ∈ (0, 1) and 
nq − l ≥ 0 in order to ensure the feasibility of steady- state equilibria.8
Based on the above, we are able to differentiate between two types of development regime for the 
economy. The first, where kt < kC, is a low- development regime in which the incidence of corrup-
tion is at its highest (both male and female bureaucrats are corrupt). The second, where kt ≥ kC, is a 
high- development regime in which the incidence of corruption is at its lowest (only male bureaucrats 
are corrupt). Those regimes are shown in Figure 1 which depicts the shape of the transition function 
F ( ⋅ ) in this economy. A steady- state equilibrium is defined by a stationary point of this function such 












> 1. Three possible 
equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1. However, only two of them are stable and they may exist simul-
taneously. One of these (associated with Cmt > 0, Cft = 0) is a high- development equilibrium in which 
















l[𝜏h−𝛼𝜒(1− 𝜏)]+𝛼(1− 𝜏)(hmt + 𝛿hft +b)
h1 − 𝛼
> kC;
F I G U R E  1  Multiple steady- state equilibria
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the other (associated with Cmt > 0, Cft > 0) is a low- development equilibrium in which the steady- state 
level of capital k∗
L
 satisfies




Our analysis above reveals that the feasibility of transition between development regimes deter-
mines the overall evolution of the economy. The complete process of transition is from the low- 
development regime to the high- development regime. Depending on initial conditions, this transition 
may or may not be accomplished such that the economy may end up locked in a low- development 
equilibrium.





 and one unstable at k∗
U
. If the economy starts with a level of capital stock k0 < k∗U, 
it is inescapably destined to converge to the low- development equilibrium k∗
L
, where all male and fe-
male bureaucrats are corrupt. In contrast, if the economy starts with a level of capital stock k0 > k∗U, 
the economy converges to the high- development equilibrium k∗
H
, where only male bureaucrats are 
corrupt (and all female bureaucrats are honest). Specifically, when the initial stock of capital is such 
that k∗
U
< k0 < k
C, the economy makes the transition from a low- capital- accumulation path to a high- 
capital- accumulation path after reaching the critical level of capital kC and converging to k∗
H
 in the long 
run. In contrast, if the initial stock of capital is such that k0 > kC, the economy is already on a high 
capital accumulation path and converges to k∗
H
. Hence, the model presents a situation in which initial 
conditions determine limiting outcomes.
Figure 2 depicts a second possible scenario where there is only a unique stable steady- state equilib-
rium at k∗
H
. If the initial stock of capital k0 < kC, the economy makes the transition from a low- capital- 
accumulation path to a high- capital- accumulation path after reaching the critical level of capital kC, 
converging eventually to k∗
H
. In contrast, if the initial stock of capital k0 > kC, the economy is already 
on a path to converge to the high- development and low- corruption equilibrium k∗
H
. Consequently, re-
gardless of the initial level of capital stock k0, the economy undergoes a complete transition towards 
the high- development equilibrium with declining female corruption, and consequently declining over-
all corruption, along the transition.
Figure 3 displays a scatter plot of average log real gross domestic product per capita (a proxy for 
economic development) and average percentage of women in parliament based on available data from 
186 countries for the period 1997– 2019 (World Bank, 2021). Discounting countries that can be con-
sidered as outliers, the figure shows a positive relationship between the share of women in parliament 
and economic development. This simple but powerful illustration validates our theoretical findings.
3.3.1 | Increasing female participation in government
We will now show how an economy in which women are wage- discriminated against in the private 
sector can potentially move from a low- capital- accumulation path to a high- capital- accumulation path 
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Equations (34) and (38) reveals that increasing the share of women in the government leads to a higher 
capital accumulation path and a higher steady- state equilibrium due to the following effects:
1. As illustrated by Equation (35), increasing the female proportion in the public sector reduces 
the total amount successfully stolen by corrupt bureaucrats. As a result, the actual provi-
sion of goods and services in the economy is higher, leading to higher savings and capital 
accumulation.
2. Given a fixed number of skilled workers of each gender, increasing the female share in the govern-
ment leads to a lower female share in the modern sector. As a result, there are fewer women being 
wage- discriminated against in the economy by working in the public sector. Therefore, total sav-
ings and capital accumulation in the economy increase.
Figure  4 illustrates a possible scenario where increasing the female proportion in the public 
sector may result in the economy moving from a multiple steady- state equilibria to a unique steady- 
state equilibrium. We begin the analysis with the case described in Figure 1, in which the capital 




) and one unstable (k∗
U
) steady- state 
F I G U R E  2  Unique steady- state equilibrium
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equilibria. As described before, if the economy starts from k0 < k∗U, it converges to a low steady- state 
equilibrium k∗
L
. Conversely, if k0 > k∗U, the economy eventually reaches the high steady- state equi-
librium k∗
H
. Now let us define F (⋅) as a capital accumulation path with a higher female proportion 
in the public sector, bft > bft. By inspecting Equation (38), it can be observed that the effect of a 
higher proportion of women bureaucrats is a steeper and higher capital accumulation path. If bft is 
sufficiently high, regardless of the initial level of capital, the economy undergoes a complete tran-
sition towards the high- development equilibrium k∗
H
. In conclusion, increasing the share of female 
bureaucrats may result in a situation in which the initial conditions do not determine the economy's 
limiting outcomes. In addition, even the high- development equilibrium improves with respect to the 





We would also like to consider a scenario in which increasing the female share of bureaucrats 
reduces the wage discrimination against women in the private sector.9 Men and women may differ in 
terms of their policy preferences (Edlund & Pande, 2002; Lott & Kenny, 1999). Moreover, a higher 
representation of women in politics could result in more policy outcomes that are in line with women's 
preferences (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Chen, 2010). Based on this evidence, a higher proportion 
of women bureaucrats may also increase the policies to reduce discrimination in the labor market. In 
Appendix B we explain our analysis when increasing the female share of bureaucrats also decreases 
the firms' taste discrimination.
F I G U R E  3  Women in parliament and economic development. Data source: World Development Indicators 
online database (World Bank, 2021)
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4 |  CONCLUSION
Our paper provides an economic explanation for the observed negative correlation between female 
participation in the government and corruption. We do not rely on the existence of gender differences 
in moral attitudes toward corruption. Thus, we contribute to the gender- corruption literature by pro-
posing another possible factor that may cause women to act more honestly than men. Specifically, 
female bureaucrats are less corrupt than male bureaucrats given that the public sector discriminates 
against women less than the private sector. An interesting avenue for future research would be to 
investigate the disproportionate impact of corruption on women, which has not received as much 
coverage in the literature.
Given that in most countries women are still under- represented in government, increasing female 
participation in government should be a primary goal in its own right to foster equal opportunity. 
Nevertheless, as illustrated in this paper, when the government is a more gender- equal employer than 
the private sector, increasing women's participation in government could result in lower corruption 
and higher development, in turn leading to lower corruption and greater gender equality. Therefore, a 
policy that increases female participation in the public sector must be accompanied by government's 
continuous efforts to promote overall gender equality in the public sector.
F I G U R E  4  Effects of an increase in the share of women in the public sector
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ENDNOTES
 1 This “learning by investing” externality is widely used in endogenous growth models.




− b∕ (1 + r) will only make agents indifferent. To actually attract 




− b∕ (1 + r) + , where 0 < 𝜀 < 𝜙h∕ (1 + r). In practice, es-




 the government avoids this issue. 





− b∕ (1 + r), the parameter b vanishes from our equations. This has no impact on our results, but we can no 
longer observe the role of the agents' public sector preference on the incentive to be corrupt.
 3 As in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), in the case of independent probabilities and for low values of p, this overall 
probability of detection approximates the true value. In addition, notice that, defining the overall probability of detec-
tion as 1 − (1 − p)Cit, we can use a Taylor series approximation to show that around p = 0, the function is close to pCit; 
and around p = 1, the function approximates 1. However, the result is not clear- cut for a value of p = a, where a ∈ (0, 1). 
We can show this by using a first- order Taylor approximation around p = a. Notice that the overall probability of 
detection then approximates Cit (p − a) (1 − a)Cit − 1 + 1 − (1 − a)Cit, which creates nonlinearities that would inevitably 
complicate our analysis. Hence, provided we are in a world in which the probability of detection for a single act of 
corruption is low, our model still holds.
 4 We could allow for the behavior of bureaucrats to depend on the actions of their peers. To enrich this extension, we 
could add a disutility of getting caught when behaving corruptly. Thus, the optimal number of corrupt acts of a bu-











, where 𝛾 > 0 is the “shame” of being dis-








, respectively, the probability of getting caught and the disutility of 
being exposed when everybody else is corrupt (non- corrupt). Based on the literature of frequency- dependent models 
of corruption (e.g., Andvig and Moene, 1990), we can assume that pc < pn and 𝛾c < 𝛾n. Hence, it is evident that the 
number of corrupt acts is greater when the incidence of corruption is high, than when the incidence of corruption is 
low.
 5 From Equation (8), we can see that wage level is driven by capital accumulation. Higher wages therefore indicate 
higher development.









the probability of detection and the disutility of being `shamed' when everybody else is corrupt (non- corrupt). 
Using this notation, the critical level of capital described by Equation (28) can take the following form under 








− b − c
)









− b − n
)





. In other words, the critical level of capital above which female bureaucrats are honest is lower when 
everybody else is honest than when everybody else is corrupt. This discussion illustrates how our model could be 
extended to incorporate the issues highlighted by the frequency- dependent literature.
 7 As in other studies (e.g., Blackburn & Forgues- Puccio, 2007, 2010), we include an exogenous cost of monitoring 
to illustrate the effect of this additional cost on public finances. One can argue that the probability of detection is a 
function of the amount spent on monitoring. However, we decided to abstract from these considerations, given that 
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the probability of detection may depend on a wide range of factors that may reflect the current state of governance in 
the country. These considerations are outside of the scope of this paper.
 8 Blackburn and Forgues- Puccio (2007) use specific assumptions for the production function and bequests to generate 
a linear capital accumulation path to study the links between income inequality, corruption, and development. We 
use the same assumptions to focus on the links between gender inequality, corruption, and development. We are con-
scious that having fixed bequests when wages are increasing is a simplification. However, this simplification allows 
us to illustrate our points in a straightforward manner without complicating the model unnecessarily. As we explain 
later, having public officials separated by gender will result in a nonlinear capital accumulation path anyway.
 9 We thank an anonymous referee for providing this feedback.
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APPENDIX A
We will prove that the maximum utilities of male and female bureaucrats obtained by choosing the 
optimum level of Cmt and Cft given by Equations (22) and (23) respectively are higher than the utility 
obtained from being honest. The expected utility of a corruptible bureaucrat is given by Equation 
(19) and the utility from being honest is obtained by setting Cit = 0 in that equation. A corruptible 
bureaucrat of gender i will commit corrupt acts if the expected utility from being corrupt is higher than 
the utility from being honest, that is, if
Combining Equations (18) and (39), we obtain the incentive condition for a male bureaucrat:
Substituting Equation (22) into Equation (40) and rearranging yields
Thus, as long as Equation (41) holds, it pays for a male bureaucrat to be corrupt by choosing the 
optimum Cmt. Note that the condition expressed in Equation (41) is consistent with the threshold 
probability of detection for a male in Equation (25). As such, we confirm that the condition represented 
by Equation (40) is fulfilled.
Combining Equations (39), (7), and (18), we obtain the equivalent incentive condition for a female 
bureaucrat:
Substituting Equation (23) into Equation (42) and rearranging yields
Thus, as long as Equation (43) holds, it pays for a female bureaucrat to be corrupt by choosing the 
optimum Cft. Note that the condition in Equation (43) is consistent with the threshold probability of 
detection for a female in Equation (26). As such, we confirm that the condition in Equation (42) is 
fulfilled.
APPENDIX B 
We now relax our earlier assumption of constant discrimination parameter, d. Instead, we consider a sit-
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and consequently increases the private sector's female workers' wages by increasing , the ratio 
of the private sector's female workers' wages to the private sector's male workers' wages, where 




,  (0) ≥ 0, 




≥ 0, maintaining the assumption of  ∈ (0, 1) .
As a consequence, this raises the female bureaucrats' outside option in the event that they get 
detected when they are being corrupt and in turn increases their incentive to commit corrupt acts. This 
results in a higher Cft, that is, the optimum number of corrupt acts committed by female bureaucrats 
(see Equation (23)). A higher  also increases the critical level of capital below which women 
bureaucrats are corrupt, and above which only men bureaucrats are corrupt while women bureaucrats 
are honest (see Equation (28)). This means it takes a longer path and higher development to induce 
women bureaucrats to be honest.
Nevertheless, Equation (35) shows that when kt < kC, increasing the female proportion of bureau-
crats unambiguously results in lower total embezzlement as long as 0 ≤  ≤ 1. This is because as 
long as women in the private sector face higher wage discrimination than women in the public sec-
tor, female bureaucrats will be less corrupt than male bureaucrats, that is Equation (24) still holds. 
Therefore, a policy to increase the share of women in the government will still have similar effects to 
the case with constant discrimination. Additionally, lower wage discrimination means higher wages 
for private sector women and consequently higher savings and capital accumulation. All in all, in-
creasing the female proportion of bureaucrats results in higher development by reducing corruption 
and increasing wage equality in the economy.
